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Graham Thompson 
“Dead letters! … Dead Men?”: The Rhetoric of the Office in 
Melville’s ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ 
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I 
  Although a good deal of recent critical attention to Melville’s writing has followed 
the lead of Robert K. Martin in addressing the issue of sexuality, the predominant themes 
in discussions of ‘Bartleby’ remain changes in the nature of the workplace in antebellum 
America and transformations in capitalism.1 But if one of the abiding mysteries of the story 
is the failure of the lawyer-narrator to sever his relationship with his young scrivener once 
Bartleby embarks upon his policy of preferring not to, it is a mystery that makes sense 
within both of these critical discourses. On the one hand the longevity of the relationship 
dramatizes a tension implicit in Michael Gilmore’s suggestion that the lawyer-narrator 
straddles the old and the new economic orders of the American marketplace. Although he 
may employ his scriveners “as a species of productive property and little else”,2 his 
attachment to his employees is overwhelmingly paternalistic and protective. On the other 
hand James Creech suggests that Pierre (published the year before ‘Bartleby’) is a novel 
preoccupied with the closeting of homosexual identity within the values of an American 
middle-class family, while Gregory Woods describes Melville as the nearest thing in the 
prose world of the American Renaissance to the Good Gay Poet Whitman. In this critical 
context the longevity of the relationship suggests that the lawyer-narrator’s desire to know 
Bartleby, to protect him, to tolerate him, to be close to him, to have him for his own, and 
then to re-tell the story of their relationship, needs to be considered in relation to sexual 
desire. 
The strength of the adhesive attachment between the two men, however, is never 
signalled explicitly in the text. Revelation seems closest only at the very end of the story, 
after Bartleby’s death, when the lawyer-narrator discovers that his former scrivener once 
worked at the Dead Letter Office in Washington, and readily admits that he can “hardly 
express the emotions which seize” him.3 More important, I think, is the representational 
status that the relationship assumes in the lawyer-narrator’s imagination when he follows 
this admission by asking himself a somewhat confusing question: “Dead letters! Does it 
not sound like dead men?” (45). While the literal answer to this question would be “no”, it 
is possible to see this question as the final narrative moment in a story whose whole 
2"
dramatic development focuses around the ways in which the emotional attachment 
between the lawyer-narrator and Bartleby is figured through the material processes of 
writing, reading, and death.  
I will show how central these processes are to the representation of male sexuality, 
but for Melville they are not separable from economic considerations. This is evident most 
clearly in ‘The Bachelors of Paradise and the Tartarus of Maids’ (1855) where the spermatic 
rhetoric of Chapter 94 of Moby-Dick—‘A Squeeze of the Hand’—is transplanted to an 
industrial paper-mill. Looking into the pulp vats the seedsman-narrator sees they are “full 
of white, wet, woolly-looking stuff, not unlike the albuminous part of an egg, soft-boiled”.4 
It is this stuff that will eventually solidify and be turned into the paper that will help him 
distribute his seed across the country; its mass production will enable the growth of the 
paper economy upon which the world of capitalist office work is built. Bartleby shares his 
‘pallid’ and ‘blank’ outlook with the maids. When the seedsman-narrator writes the name 
of his young male guide Cupid onto a piece of paper and drops it into the spermy pulp, 
and watches it travel untouched past the virginal maids through the machine to come out 
at the end of the process neatly incorporated into a foolscap sheet of paper, Melville is 
splicing together economics with gender and sexuality so that they would seem to underpin 
the reading and writing that are so much a part of ‘Bartleby’.  
This is why the economic citadel of the office is so important in ‘Bartleby’; it is the 
place where the reading and writing are supposed to take place. Although the office has 
not been entirely overlooked in previous studies of this story, as a specific spatial site with 
the power to organize and structure personal and social relationships it has remained 
stubbornly underdeveloped, and has not been considered at all in the literary field in 
relation to male sexuality.5 Yet one only has to consider the lawyer-narrator’s inexpressible 
emotion just mentioned, the importance of the screen behind which Bartleby sits in his 
“hermitage”, or indeed Bartleby’s refusal to explain himself in the workplace, to see that 
this office narrative is constructed from those pairings—public and private, surveillance 
and self-surveillance, disclosure and secrecy—which Eve Sedgwick has described as not 
only the “crucial sites for the contestation of meaning” in Western culture since the latter 
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part of the nineteenth century, but also all “indelibly marked with the historical specificity 
of homosocial/homosexual definition”.6 
 A useful way of thinking about ‘Bartleby’ as a product of the 1850s, then, is to 
think about it as a story that stands at the threshold of modern American anxiety about the 
crisis of male definition in capitalist culture. I want to treat ‘Bartleby’ as a tense, desire-
laden tale of an ageing bachelor7 who is the lawyer-narrator, and a pale, innocent young 
man who is his scrivener. As will become apparent, notions of visuality play a key role in 
my thinking and I want to pay particular attention to the lawyer, since in scopic terms the 
narrative is framed quite specifically through the visual logic of his recollection: “What my 
own astonished eyes saw of Bartleby, that is all I know of him” (13). Surveilling past events 
for the lawyer-narrator means trying to read Bartleby and his relationship with him all over 
again to search for the meaning of the relationship as it originally occurred. 
 
 
II 
 The first thing to note about the office is that it is perhaps surprising that it 
remained outside the orbit of Foucault’s attention in his studies of surveillance and the 
“carceral city”, especially when one sets what he writes—that it was “the growth of a 
capitalist economy [which] gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose 
general formulas ... could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or 
institutions”8 (my emphasis)—against the clear facts that the office and its various functions 
are tied so closely into capitalist development. Once it became necessary to control and 
finance industrialization, and once offices became the focal points for communication and 
the control of complexity, it was no longer tenable to run large, international concerns 
from the houses of merchants as it had been in the eighteenth century when administrative 
functions were often minimal. Only in the nineteenth century did cities begin to see the 
growth of specialized office quarters.9 And yet although Foucault was more concerned 
with capitalist surveillance in factories and workshops than he was in offices, his analysis of 
the “imaginary geo-politics” of the carceral city with its “multiple network of diverse 
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elements—walls, space, institution, rules, discourse”, allows the office to be considered as 
in many ways the home of those new disciplines characterizing capitalist disciplinary 
society: supervision, assessment, visibility, the distribution of bodies in space, 
normalization, hierarchies of power.10 The office, in its original manifestation, developed 
within the same logic and legacy of modernity which bequeathed a “vigilance of 
intersecting gazes”11 to Western culture.  
 This development of the office was also part of one of the key features in the shift 
from a pre-industrial economy to a capitalist industrial economy in America: the separation 
of work from home. This separation, important across class divisions, was particularly 
important in terms of gender for middle-class businessmen and professionals, allowing 
each of the developing gender binaries to be allocated, via discourse, a zone in which they 
could legitimately operate: very generally, middle-class men in the workplace, “their” 
women in the home. Once men became associated with the workplace, so male identity 
increasingly came to be configured through work.12 
 The lawyer-narrator is actually a very sophisticated manager, one who despite his 
age is well-attuned to the requirements of surveillance in organizing subordinate staff in an 
office, and his narrative is organized in a similar fashion. The opening five pages of the 
story make evident and crucial the location of bodies in space. The detail of the description 
of the walled-in office, which is both poetic and meticulous, as well as again being 
dominated by a rhetoric of vision, continues that preoccupation with the mapping of space 
Melville exhibited in his sea narratives.13 
It is with the arrival of Bartleby, however, that the incoherence of this nominally 
well-organized office space becomes apparent. After being forced to explain how the office 
is actually split in two and separated by folding, ground- glass doors,14 the lawyer-narrator 
makes two linked responses, both crucial to the development of the story. He first of all 
describes Bartleby as “motionless ... pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn”—
adjectives and adverbs which register him in a role of passivity—but then also embarks 
upon a vital further demarcation of the office space. Despite thinking that Bartleby’s 
“sedate aspect ... might operate beneficially upon the flighty temper of Turkey, and the 
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fiery one of Nippers”, Bartleby is actually given a desk behind a screen in the lawyer-
narrator’s part of the office. With Bartleby isolated from his sight but not his voice, so, 
according to the lawyer-narrator, “privacy and society were conjoined” (19).  
Several things are apparent here: the phonocentric conjugation of voice with 
society; the failure of the lawyer-narrator (tellingly) to adduce whose privacy it is he thinks 
he is preserving (it can’t be his own since while he can intrude behind the screen with his 
voice any time he chooses, Bartleby can also step out from behind the screen without 
knocking whenever he chooses); the admission that space cannot be marked by screens or 
doors but is more contingent than that and can be infinitely reassessed; and the lawyer-
narrator’s disavowing logic which wants Bartleby to control his other employees whilst 
keeping him all to himself in his side of the office. Two classes of space produced so 
meticulously—in the office, in the lawyer-narrator’s narrative—suddenly collapse into one 
another upon the arrival of Bartleby whilst, once more disavowingly, the lawyer-narrator 
tries to demarcate them syntactically. By the admission that privacy and society, the private 
and the public, are proximate at the level of being internal to one another, and through this 
increasing demarcation of his office, the lawyer-narrator is actually destabilizing the very 
coherence of the project he is professing. The consequences of this process will result in 
him having to keep on classifying and separating in this manner until he reaches a stage—
which he does later in the narrative—where the incoherence of his strategy becomes clear 
to him (and its link to male sexuality transparent) and he is forced to re-order—both his 
office and sexuality, his attachment to Bartleby—through the ultimate rejection and the 
ultimate disavowal. This is the crisis which Bartleby provokes in the lawyer-narrator and 
which the lawyer-narrator is only able to piece together in his retrospective narrative, his 
re-ordering of events connected to Bartleby.15 It is in the scopic frame of his narrative of 
Bartleby where he has to confront his own self and where he recognizes what thus far he 
has been passing over or misrecognizing: that his identity as a man in the masculine and 
public world of work and patriarchy cannot permit the desire he has for Bartleby or other 
men to be vectored through sex.  
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 As a way of explaining in more detail how the office and its surveillance strategies 
impact on this realm of male sexuality, however, I think Foucault’s argument that the body 
becomes the site on which disciplinary power plays itself out16 is insufficient in the light of 
the emphasis I place on the regime of the visual and needs to be supplemented by some 
more recent developments in thinking about male sexuality.  
 Lee Edelman has written how the imperative to produce homosexual difference as 
a determinate entity in the twentieth century and before has often relied on “reading” the 
body as a textual "signifier of sexual orientation”.17 As well as having been positioned in 
such a proscriptive relation to language—peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non 
nominandum—homosexuality and homosexual men, along with their bodies, their clothes, 
gestures, language, certain buildings and public places of meeting, have always been 
positioned so that they are intimately related to questions of visibility and legibility. And 
especially so once it began to be assumed by the discourses of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Western culture that a subject’s relation to sexuality and desire was essential rather 
than contingent.18 But at the same time as the homosexual man comes to be distinctively 
marked, becomes a text, it must also be possible for those hallmarks which distinguish him 
to pass unremarked, Edelman argues. So that  
 
... heterosexuality has ... been able to reinforce the status of its own 
authority as ‘natural’ (i.e. unmarked, authentic, and non-representational) 
by defining the straight body against the ‘threat’ of an ‘unnatural’ 
homosexuality—a ‘threat’ the more effectively mobilized by generating 
concern about homosexuality’s unnerving ... capacity to ‘pass,’ to remain 
invisible, in order to call into being a variety of disciplinary ‘knowledges’ 
through which homosexuality might be recognized, exposed, and 
ultimately rendered, more ominously, invisible once more.19 
  
For Edelman this entry of homosexuality into the field of writing and textuality is 
the first thing his theory of homographesis denotes. But this writing of homosexuality is 
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reliant upon a second order of visuality, where there is “the need to construe such an 
emblem of homosexual difference that will securely situate that difference within the 
register of visibility”.20 Such an emblem is effeminacy,21 which increasingly comes to be the 
interchangeable with homosexuality—especially as sexuality becomes more tightly linked 
with gender ideology.22 
 Under these conditions male sexuality becomes susceptible to two different and 
completely discontinuous readings—heterosexual and homosexual. While the necessity of 
a visual marker to separate them out is compelling—since they must exist in the symbolic 
order of sexuality in the same way that gender difference does—the necessity of creating 
“homosexual difference” and “the homosexual” actually impacts upon all male identities 
because one has to read all male identities (and, of course, one’s own male identity) to see 
whether they exhibit the hallmark of sexual difference; it textualizes all male identity and 
requires that all male identity be “read”. The putting into writing of homosexual difference, 
then, also puts into writing the essentialized nature of identity, the result being—and this is 
the second thing that Edelman’s theory of homographesis denotes—the deconstruction, or 
de-scription, of a metaphorical notion of identity, and the consequent deconstruction of 
the binary logic of sameness and difference upon which symbolic identity is based. 
 Edelman’s position clearly suggests the centrality of a scopic constituent for the 
organization of male sexuality in modernity. Going further than Edelman, I want to make 
explicit that the links here with surveillance become increasingly irresistible. What I want to 
argue is that Foucauldian surveillance is actually a sophisticated form of reading and that 
this reading is potently implicated in that manoeuvre whereby the male subject needs to be 
positioned in one of two increasingly discontinuous and hierarchically organized identities 
during the course of the nineteenth century—the homo and the hetero--where the 
boundary between these two needs to be policed constantly. And it is policed by the 
continuance of reading and surveillance;23 by the entangled methods of regulation and 
deconstruction identified in Edelman’s theory of homographesis. 
 In a similar vein, Jonathan Dollimore has identified how sexual contact between 
men as it has variously been signified through Western history—as sin, as vice, as 
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unnatural, as crime—has carried with it a contradictory metaphysics of evil which has its 
roots in an Augustinian theology which places sexual perversion as a corruption of good 
that stands in subordinate but proximate relation to the dominant. This means that it is 
only possible to conceptualize evil through good. Dollimore identifies two kinds of relation 
which result: 
 
First: those proximities will permanently remind the dominant of its 
actual instability, all forms of domination being unstable to a varying 
degree, as well as produce a paranoid fear of impending subversion. So 
there will be both a justified fear as well as an excess of fear; second, that 
proximity will become the means enabling displacement and projection, 
while the justified/paranoid fears will be their motivation: proximity 
becomes a condition of displacement; which in turn marks the 
same/proximate as radically other.24 
 
Here is why male-male sexual contact, whilst socially marginalized, has retained its central 
symbolic function in Western society. This metaphysical order is played out in the social 
and the cultural. The proximate is internal and yet has to be made “radically other” in 
an/other space. As the lawyer-narrator says, if Bartleby had admitted to having any friends 
or relatives, “I would instantly have written, and urged their taking the poor fellow away to 
some convenient retreat” (32). 
 Put simply, then, my argument is that the development of the visual regime of the 
office and the development of the twin categories of homo and hetero in the nineteenth 
century, whilst they may simply coincide in temporal terms, are definitely not coincidental 
in the sense of having an arbitrary relationship. The office, a surveilling regime constructed 
from those discursive pairings so crucial in the development of the epistemology of 
modern Western sexuality, facilitates a reading regime which works to re-inscribe these 
discursive pairings. If it appears that this argument suggests that the office is organized 
solely in terms of sex then I should make it clear that this is not what I am arguing. Clearly 
9"
surveillance in capitalism serves other purposes, such as class control and the construction 
of the bourgeois subject. And yet these categories are not separate from the work of 
surveillance and the construction of sexuality. Whilst the office may be the site where many 
forms of capitalist surveillance takes place, it is also not a site which excludes particular 
kinds of surveillance. If the binary of work and home is an incoherent one, then so must 
be the boundary which tries to secure for the workplace exclusive rights to a surveillance 
which is only about class and capitalism. Especially in a story like ‘Bartleby’ which is so 
concerned with the emotional attachment between two men. 
 I think that Edelman’s and Dollimore’s work can join together at this point to help 
throw light on the development of the story in ‘Bartleby’ as I have already described it, but 
more importantly that they help in an analysis of what subsequently happens to the lawyer-
narrator and the way that he manages the desire which only increases as Bartleby refuses to 
do what he asks of him. 
 
III 
Bartleby’s initial refusal is a refusal to read, and whilst this means that Bartleby is 
not doing the job for which he is being paid, in a disciplinary regime of surveillance and 
self-surveillance the refusal to read—whether it be one’s position in one’s surroundings, 
the surveilling gaze, oneself—is an act which threatens more than just profits and 
efficiency. Likewise, in a regime where the reading of other men is becoming vital to the 
consolidation of identity within a gender, Bartleby’s stance is particularly disturbing. Quite 
literally, Bartleby refuses to read himself in public; that is, he refuses to speak about himself 
in public: “he had declined telling who he was, or whence he came, or whether he had any 
relatives in the world” (28). Unplaced as a man, the placing, the reading, is all left to the 
lawyer-narrator. However, in the process of inscribing Bartleby in some of the ways I have 
already mentioned, ways which place his strange mysteriousness and his unknowability in 
direct relation to those rhetorical structures which will later come to denote an effeminate 
homosexuality25 (ways which the whole retrospective narrative of re-remembrance, re-
constitution and general behindsight of the narrative key into), the lawyer-narrator actually 
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participates in the second stage of Edelman’s notion of homographesis, the de-scription of 
any potentially metaphorical or fixed nature of male identity. 
 This reversal of the lawyer-narrator’s surveilling gaze begins almost immediately 
Bartleby refuses to read: “there was something about Bartleby that not only strangely 
disarmed me, but in a wonderful manner touched and disconcerted me” (21, my emphasis). 
Bartleby’s refusal, instead of reflecting Bartleby back to the lawyer-narrator, actually makes 
the lawyer-narrator contemplate himself. The lawyer-narrator disavowingly convinces 
himself of Bartleby’s usefulness to him. Not throwing him out becomes protecting him 
from a potentially less sympathetic employer. “To befriend Bartleby; to humor him in his 
strange wilfulness, will cost me little or nothing, while I lay up in my soul what will 
eventually prove a sweet morsel for my conscience” (23-4). Of course what it means also is 
that the lawyer-narrator can keep Bartleby close to him; Bartleby is successfully internalized 
not just by the spatial organization of the lawyer-narrator’s side of the office but in the 
rhetorical manoeuvre which means that Bartleby is somehow literally inside the lawyer-
narrator, an ingested “sweet morsel”. So desperate is the lawyer-narrator to maintain 
Bartleby in his employ that he allows him all sorts of “strange peculiarities, privileges, and 
unheard of exemptions” which soon the lawyer-narrator becomes used to, so much so that 
“every added repulse ... which I received only tended to lessen the probability of my 
repeating the inadvertence” (26).  
This inversion or role reversal is continued during the lawyer-narrator’s Sunday 
morning visit to his office. When he finds Bartleby “saying quietly that he was sorry that he 
was deeply engaged just then, and—preferred not admitting me at present” (26), the 
lawyer-narrator is the one who is forced into the position of having to “knock” to enter his 
own premises. Not only this. Bartleby, having made a home out of the office, has collapsed 
the home/work and public/private separation. He has domesticated the office. Which also 
means feminizing it. The lawyer-narrator walks away, disconcerted by the way that 
Bartleby’s “wonderful mildness ... not only disarmed me, but unmanned me, as it were. For 
I consider that one, for the time, is a sort of unmanned when he tranquilly permits his 
hired clerk to dictate to him, and order him away from his own premises” (27). So, the 
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lawyer-narrator is unmanned by not being able to control his employees, and unmanned by 
having his office domesticated. But he is also unmanned too, surely, by the rhetoric of 
penetration in Bartleby’s refusal to admit him, to allow him to take that active position in 
the active/passive binary of sexual contact. Here one can see the classification of gender 
division beginning to affect relations between men. It is Bartleby’s passiveness—a 
description reinforced over and over in the story—his “wonderful mildness”, which is 
unmanning the lawyer-narrator. It bespeaks a manning which is susceptible to that second 
denotation of homographesis, the de-scription of a masculine male identity. 
 When the lawyer-narrator returns to the office and embarks upon the most 
thorough investigation of Bartleby in his absence, identifying each of his meagre 
belongings, and through them his “miserable friendlessness and loneliness”, (27) he 
recognizes the fraternal relationship which bonds him to Bartleby, and which leads him 
“on to other and more special thoughts, concerning the eccentricities of Bartleby. 
Presentiments of strange discoveries hovered around me” (28). Considering the 
internalized state in which Bartleby exists for the lawyer-narrator, and considering the 
points I made in the previous paragraph about penetration, unmanning, and the instability 
of male identity, the nature of these “special thoughts” and “strange discoveries” would 
seem to be tied up intimately with this desire the lawyer-narrator is directing towards 
Bartleby. 
 What follows is the lawyer-narrator’s intrusion into Bartleby’s locked desk. This is a 
key moment in determining the lawyer-narrator’s attitude towards Bartleby and one which 
has been prepared for quite thoroughly by the narrative. This moment needs to be read in 
the context of the lawyer-narrator having walked away from his office “incontinently”26 
when Bartleby refused him entry; in the context of Nippers’s chronic indigestion and the 
references to nuts and spices and the capitalist emphasis upon bodily regularity and control 
connected to the time-clock of discipline; in the context of a phallic thematics of dis-
arming; in the context of the lawyer-narrator having noted earlier that the “the interval 
between this [outside] wall and mine not a little resembled a huge square cistern” (14); in 
the context of a scopic regime of private and public and their importance in the male 
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washroom—which is what the lawyer-narrator’s office effectively becomes next to this 
cistern—when the urinal and the cubicle allow, respectively, the display of the phallus in 
public and the loosening of the sphincter in private.27 In the light of all this, when the 
lawyer-narrator intrudes into the desk the presence of an anal thematics becomes 
unmistakable. Indeed, this link between the desk and the anus has been made directly, 
because the reader has been told already that Nippers’s struggle to accommodate his too 
tightly controlled sphincter is dramatized by his inability to find a comfortable height for 
his desk (16-17). In the desk  
 
Every thing was methodically arranged, the papers smoothly placed. The 
pigeon holes were deep, and removing the files of documents, I groped into 
their recesses. Presently I felt something there, and dragged it out. It was an 
old bandanna handkerchief, heavy and knotted. I opened it, and saw it was a 
savings bank” (28).28  
 
For the lawyer-narrator it is this extraction of coins from Bartleby’s desk/anus which leads 
to the clearest moment of surveillance of Bartleby, the moment when the lawyer-narrator 
recalls “all the quiet mysteries which I had noted in the man” (28). This passage of 
revelation is worth quoting at length: 
 
Revolving all these things, and coupling them with the recently discovered 
fact that he made my office his constant abiding place and home, and not 
forgetful of his morbid moodiness; revolving all these things, a prudential 
feeling began to steal over me. My first emotions had been those of pure 
melancholy and sincerest pity; but just in proportion as the forlornness of 
Bartleby grew and grew to my imagination, did that same melancholy merge 
into fear, that pity into repulsion. So true it is, and so terrible too, that up to 
a certain point the thought or sight of misery enlists our best affections; but, 
in certain special cases, beyond that point it does not. They err who would 
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assert that invariably this is owing to the inherent selfishness of the human 
heart. It rather proceeds from a certain hopelessness of remedying excessive 
and organic ill. To a sensitive being, pity is not seldom pain. And when at 
last it is perceived that such pity cannot lead to effectual succor, common 
sense bids the soul be rid of it. What I saw that morning persuaded me that 
the scrivener was the victim of innate and incurable disorder. I might give 
alms to his body; but his body did not pain him; it was his soul that 
suffered, and his soul I could not reach (29). 
 
 What is so tempting about this passage is that moment when the lawyer-narrator 
sees his “melancholy merge into fear” and his “pity into repulsion”. In the light of 
Dollimore’s ideas, what appears to be happening here is that the lawyer-narrator is fulfilling 
that manoeuvre his marking of difference in Bartleby has been moving towards. He is 
marking “the same/proximate as radically other.” The melancholy and the pity which so 
connected him to Bartleby that Bartleby became internal to him now suddenly are 
transformed—how exactly does melancholy merge into fear, pity into repulsion?—into the 
fear and repulsion which will help him to paranoically separate himself completely from 
Bartleby. Following Dollimore and Edelman, the lawyer-narrator’s very proximity to 
Bartleby is the reason for this fear and repulsion; it is the proximity caused by evil being 
internal to good, and by de-scription being implicated in the process of inscription which 
relies so heavily on the never stable visual register. The impossibility of any separation 
haunts the lawyer-narrator: “I trembled to think that my contact with the scrivener had 
already and seriously affected me in a mental way. And what further and deeper aberration 
might it not yet produce? This apprehension had not been without efficacy in determining 
me to summary measures” (31).  
 The summary measures the lawyer-narrator decides upon are, of course, to fulfil 
his final separation from Bartleby. The lawyer-narrator, so culpable in first differentiating 
Bartleby by spatial surveillance, so culpable in opening up Bartleby to a surveilling gaze, so 
culpable in internalizing Bartleby in his own male identity, is now paying the spatial 
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consequences, the consequences of a logic which tries to have as separate and external 
what is so proximate and internal. How can one separate oneself from that upon which 
one relies to be oneself? The lawyer-narrator is forced to do something once he realizes 
that Bartleby is “scandalizing my professional reputation ... I resolved to gather all my 
faculties together, and for ever rid me of this intolerable incubus” (38). He moves his 
chambers and Bartleby is eventually removed to the Tombs where he dies fairly soon after. 
And it is here that the lawyer-narrator’s asks his confusing question: “Dead letters! Does it 
not sound like dead men?” 
 
IV 
 One of the features of the Dead Letter Office, and of the dead letters that would 
have reached it, was a breakdown in communication. The letters are deprived of their 
intended reader and are read instead by someone to whom they mean something different. 
The reader of the letters is the same—a reader—but different—not the intended reader—
and the content of the letter consequently fails to “mean” because of context. When asking 
himself about the similarity of dead letters and dead men, the lawyer-narrator is, I suggest, 
referencing the reading of men by other men, and the likelihood that, as with the letters 
whose meaning is contextual, so it is with men in the environment of the office and of 
work. Relationships between men are now beginning to carry the weight of reading and 
recognition and, conscious of this, men now need to display a meaning—masculine, active, 
solid—which will be read and understood in this context so that it will reach its intended 
receiver. Through his question the lawyer-narrator appears to be suggesting that Bartleby 
fails to do this. In the world of office work he has displayed all the wrong letters and has 
consequently been read out of context. Of course the lawyer-narrator knows exactly the 
context in which these letters should have been read: the context of male-male relations 
that permit sexual contact. And he knows because he recognizes that these letters are the 
ones internal and proximate to his own identity which relies upon the disavowal of them 
and of male-male sexual contact. He reads Bartleby and himself clearly enough, only then 
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to consign the letters which make up Bartleby to the Dead Letter Office. He reads then 
disavows, claims not to understand. 
 The greatest paradox of all, though, lies in the fact that it is the lawyer-narrator 
himself who has been responsible for inscribing all these letters in Bartleby in the first 
place. He is the one responsible for visualizing and writing the narrative of Bartleby. In 
effect, the lawyer-narrator has written a letter to himself which he can consign to the Dead 
Letter Office once he has disavowed so successfully that he can satisfy himself he does not 
understand the content, and therefore that the message does not really apply to him. This 
manoeuvre is reinforced by the enigmatic way in which the whole story of Bartleby is told 
by the lawyer-narrator. He tries to forget his reactions to Bartleby through the sublimation 
of his feelings of desire into the rhetoric which shapes the story: the damaging divisions of 
private/public, surveillance/self-surveillance and secrecy/disclosure which underpin the 
link between such a phrase in the story as “hardly can I express the emotions which seized 
me” and others like “strangely disarmed”, “special thoughts”, “strange discoveries”, and 
“our best affections”. 
 That these divisions are understood by the lawyer-narrator himself to be damaging 
is witnessed by the way in which it is possible to read in Melville’s story a meditation on 
the consequence of this whole process of surveillance, the marking of difference, and 
disavowal—namely death. Indeed, Robert K. Martin has observed that Melville was unable 
“to imagine what it might have been like for two men to love each other and survive”.29 
Bartleby dies as a direct consequence of the lawyer-narrator’s quest to be rid of that which 
is proximate and which is made radically other. It is the fracturing of male identity into 
radically discontinuous classes of sexuality which one can see beginning to take place in 
Bartleby and which will become more intense as the century goes on and which Melville 
himself will dramatize so forcefully in Billy Budd. The results of this kind of epistemological 
organizing of identity are literally fatal. If dead letters sound like dead men then dead men 
sound worryingly like dead letters; immediately identifiable but instantly made different and 
disavowed, it is the men who are made to bear the letters of their identity so visibly who 
end up suffering Bartleby’s fate.  
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